Eighteen months in a bubble
With more than 30 years of industry experience and as a former member of the Norwegian Energy Commission, Berit Tennbakk led the secretariat for the Nuclear Power Commission, supported, among others, by Øystein Sand at THEMA. Together, the two economists helped build the knowledge base behind a report with a clear conclusion: Norway should not launch a full nuclear power process now, but instead build competence so that a better decision can be made later.
For eighteen months they worked, as Øystein himself describes it, “in a bubble”. The work was intense, complex and marked by confidentiality. Around them a loud debate on nuclear power was under way, while they sat in the midst of the careful work of building a knowledge base that would withstand both professional and political pressure.
When the Commission’s report was finally presented, the conclusion was clear: Norway should not start a process aimed at establishing nuclear power now. At the same time, the Commission recommends that the country builds competence and capacity that can make it easier and faster to take a position on the question later. These are the two main recommendations the report centres on.
For Øystein, the work has offered a rare insight into how a major public inquiry actually comes into being. The Commission, led by Kristin Halvorsen, was responsible for the assessments and recommendations. “We have worked for the Commission and facilitated the process,” says Øystein. “We’ve done both professional and administrative tasks.” He lists, among other things, organising meetings and a study trip, preparations and presentations of technical background material, compiling input from different environments, and drafting parts of the inquiry. “We’ve been central throughout the process.”
Work that had to be done properly
For Berit, who was head of the secretariat, it all started with a simple thought: “If nuclear power is to be assessed, then I want it to be assessed properly,” she says. “And inquiries are what I’ve worked with my whole life, so I can do that.”
That also characterises the report. It is extensive—not because the Commission wanted to write at length, but because the task required it. The nuclear power question is not only about technology. It is also about economics, safety, law, emergency preparedness, international obligations, waste management, ethics and social acceptance. The report was to bring all of this together into a single, shared knowledge base.
The Commission worked for eighteen months, across 22 meetings. The first phase largely became a learning phase with presentations from Norwegian and international expert communities, background notes and discussions intended to bring the multidisciplinary Commission to a shared level of knowledge. Berit describes this as a necessary part of the process. The Commission consisted of experts in many fields, but “each person is an expert in their own area, but no one is an expert in everything”. Before they could draw conclusions, they needed to establish a common language and a common basis for discussing a topic that in practice affects the entire energy system and the surrounding societal structures.
A question that affects many parts of society
Øystein joined the work as someone relatively new to working life, and describes it as both demanding and rewarding to contribute to such a heavyweight expert Commission. “I didn’t really know what I was getting into,” he says. “It was a bit daunting at first.”
What made an impression was not only the weight of the issue, but how complex the question really is. “It has become much clearer to me how complicated the question of nuclear power is,” he says. “It’s a question that is far bigger than what is technologically possible—it affects society in so many ways.”
Berit points in the same direction. She says that during the work she became more sceptical than she had been beforehand—not for principled reasons, but because more premises became clearer. She was particularly surprised at how commercially immature SMR technology still is, and how extensive the supporting framework around nuclear power actually has to be. “Safety rules, oversight and emergency preparedness aren’t just nice to have—they’re must-haves,” she says.
Unwise to rush based on what we know today – the future is uncertain
The report’s two main recommendations are clear. Norway should not start a full process aimed at establishing nuclear power now. At the same time, we can build up competence, knowledge and capacity that can make it easier to start such a process later, should it become relevant. This is a distinction the Commission itself emphasises: the conclusion is not a principled no, but a clear recommendation to wait before entering a full-scale course of action.
The explanation lies in the combination of costs, maturity and time. The report points out that small modular reactors (SMRs) are still not commercialised. At the same time, the costs of both small and large reactors are high, and the Commission’s analyses indicate that nuclear power in Norway is not profitable given today’s outlook for costs and future electricity prices.
The report also notes that Norway lacks much of the regulatory framework, public authorities and expertise that must be in place for it to become a nuclear power country. The Commission therefore assesses that nuclear power production in Norway is not realistic before the mid-2040s at the earliest.
“We’re not ready to make a decision on nuclear power,” says Berit. She points out that Norway today does not have a sufficiently established framework for who is responsible for what, that the Atomic Energy Act has not been used for nuclear power in a Norwegian context, and that detailed legislation is lacking. That is why establishing nuclear power with low risk in Norway would take a long time now. But much is uncertain about the future, and we can shorten the road at the next crossroads. “There are many preparations you can make,” she says, “but the first step is to map what we lack and what we must address, and to make a plan.”
Øystein also stresses that the report does not say that nuclear power is incompatible with Norwegian security or Norwegian conditions. On the contrary, nuclear power can be operated with low risk to health and the environment in Norway—but only if the entire safety apparatus is actually in place. “Nuclear power is considered safe provided it is done properly,” he says. “And that is an important caveat.”
Not just technology, but the state, the system and society
One thing the work has made clear is how easily the nuclear power debate is reduced to a question of reactors and technology. The report points to something much broader: if Norway is to become a nuclear power country, it must build up a regulatory and institutional framework that in itself will be extensive. The authorities must have oversight competence. Educational institutions must be able to deliver relevant expertise. Regulations must be developed. Emergency preparedness must be planned. Waste and decommissioning must be handled in a very long-term perspective.
Berit describes this as one of the most important realisations in the work. “It’s not as simple as just building a nuclear power plant,” she says. “Because of the use of radioactive fuel and the radioactive waste that is produced, safety must be taken especially seriously.” In practice, that means that a long list of issues must be clarified before one can even talk seriously about breaking ground.
The report also refers to the so-called milestone approach recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency for new nuclear power countries, and which the Commission recommends Norway follow if it chooses nuclear power. It is a step-by-step approach based on international experience—precisely because nuclear power is not just about buying technology, but about building an entire system to safeguard safety around it.
Waste, acceptance and a long time horizon
Another topic that made an impression on both Berit and Øystein is the long-term aspect of nuclear power. Spent fuel must be handled safely for thousands of years, and repository solutions are technically, politically and socially challenging. The report points out that Finland is the only country in the world that has completed a permanent repository for spent fuel.
Berit highlights this as a good example of why social acceptance is not a side issue, but a core point. “Acceptance,” she says, “takes time and must be worked on.” She notes in particular that the siting of repositories and the handling of waste have historically been among the most challenging aspects for the nuclear power industry internationally.
It is also a reminder of why the report ends with the sober conclusion it does. It does not say that nuclear power can never become relevant for Norway. But it shows how many preconditions must be met before the question is even ripe for a broadly anchored political decision. That is why the Commission concludes that the most responsible approach now is to build knowledge—not to launch a full-scale effort.
A contribution to a more informed debate
“Having contributed to the work has been very educational and rewarding,” says Øystein. Berit describes it as a privilege to be able to go so deep into a question from so many angles—also far beyond what she herself had worked most with before. Both point out that the work has given them greater respect for how much must actually be in place before nuclear power can become a realistic option in Norway.
And perhaps that is precisely where the report has its greatest value for the Norwegian energy debate. Not primarily in saying yes or no, but in shifting the conversation from slogans to prerequisites—from enthusiasm to realism—from what is technologically possible to what is institutionally and socially feasible. Berit and Øystein hope the report will contribute to a more informed and fact-based debate.
